
There is an undisputed general law in public finance that sound fiscal policies must precede a sound currency. What is in dispute is what constitutes a sound fiscal policy. Neo-liberals deem recurring fiscal deficits as signs of unsound fiscal policy. Yet over the multi-year duration of most recession phases of business cycles in market economies, multi-year deficit financing to stimulate economic activities in a recession can be a very sound fiscal policy.
Under such circumstances, a balanced annual budget would be quite the opposite of a sound fiscal policy. Still, some recessions may take more than a decade to recover, even with persistent fiscal deficits if the funds are spent on wrong targets, as in the case of Japan after the Plaza Accord of 1985.
In Japan after Plaza Accord, the fiscal deficit did not help the Japanese economy because it had been spent on the wrong targets. Realistically, reducing the debt/GDP (gross domestic product) ratio is difficult with only fiscal reform: the economy must also be on a growth path.
As the fiscal deficit widens, the Bank of Japan bought up larger amounts of government bonds to avoid disruption in the government bond market. In this sense, Japan today resembles post-World War II United States, where the Federal Reserve implemented a bond price support policy to keep interest rates low.
Moreover, just as the exchange rate of the dollar was not damaged by Federal Reserve policy of bond support to keep interest rate low, the bond-buying trend in Japan has not lowered market confidence in the yen. Similar to the US in that period, Japan is a creditor that enjoys a persistent current account surplus. Thus Japan has the strength to ward off market challenges to confidence in its currency despite the mounting government debt financed by the central bank.
US policy after World War II was to buy government bonds by quantitative easing to check rampant rise in public debt, and to leverage economic growth for a soft-landing of the debt/GDP ratio. Japan today is similar in that the Bank of Japan is buying a limited amount of government bonds, but differs in that it shows no signs of halting growing debt and is falling into deflation and economic stagnation.
Quantitative easing (QE) describes a central bank monetary policy to increase the supply of money in an economy when the bank interest rate, discount rate and/or interbank interest rate are either at, or close to, zero.
A central bank does this by first crediting its own account with money it has created ex nihilo (out of nothing). It then purchases financial assets, including government bonds and corporate bonds, from banks and other financial institutions in a process referred to as open market operation. The purchases, by way of account deposits, give banks the excess reserves required by them to create new money by the process of deposit multiplication from increased lending in the fractional reserve banking system. The increase in the money supply thus stimulates the economy. Risks include overeasing, spurring hyperinflation, or the risk of not being effective enough, if banks opt simply to pocket the additional cash in order to increase their capital reserves in a climate of increasing defaults in their present loan portfolio. The latter seems to be what has happened in 2009 in US banks.
Post-Napoleonic War England shows that fiscal deficits can be cut even under deflation. In England’s case, however, improved productivity after the industrial revolution and the subsequent population increase generated high growth that more than offset deflation and helped lower the debt ratio. Japan, however, suffers not only low growth but also population decline; reducing the debt/GDP ratio under deflation seems unrealistic. The US economy will face population growth problems if current anti-immigration sentiments continue. Coupled with slow growth, the US economy will face many of the same problems faced by Japan it her lost decade.
As in the US, Japanese citizens share a sense of urgency regarding Japan’s fiscal health. In a public opinion poll, 60% of respondents already think that “raising consumption tax is unavoidable to maintain the social security system” (Yomiuri Shimbun, November 2009 survey). Behind such opinion is the heightened sense of crisis concerning Japan’s deteriorating fiscal health following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy shock; stronger understanding that new financial resources are necessary to improve child-rearing support and impoverished healthcare; and the reality that even “budget screening” will only produce marginal revenue. Recent media coverage juxtaposing Greece’s crisis with Japan’s fiscal situation may also be contributing to public awareness. Yet the US, unlike Japan, does not enjoy a trade surplus to tap the consumption of other economies to cushion a reduction of its own fiscal deficits spending.
Japan’s 2009 government debt ratio is on par with post-Napoleonic War England (accumulative long-term debt reached 171% of GDP). The government bond market survives because almost all of the bonds are denominated in yen and held domestically (about 95%), and there is significant political room to raise taxes in the future.
Japan’s current 25.1% tax burden ratio (fiscal 2008) is low compared to European countries (England 37.5%; France 37.6%; Sweden 51.5%), and the possibility of a consumption tax hike is particularly high. If citizens recognize that their tax burden is low and accept a higher consumption tax there is no reason why the government bond market should collapse from worries over bond redemption. As society ages and the savings rate falls, however, Japan does face a gradual decline in its capacity to absorb government bonds.
Of course, to reduce the debt ratio Japan must not only raise taxes but also shake free from deflation and embark on an economic growth track (high nominal growth that yields a degree of inflation). Japan is fortunate to be in proximity of rapidly growing emerging markets such as China, affording it great potential to maintain growth by maximizing such demand. Whether Japan can really leverage this demand is unclear, but the potential leaves the door open to fiscal reform.
While Japan’s fiscal situation is therefore severe, there are paths towards improvement such as tax increases and growth. The issue is whether there is the political will to stanch further fiscal deterioration and make tax hikes and growth a reality. Absent a show of government will in this direction, the market will focus only on the negatives such as a falling capacity to absorb government bonds and difficulties in spurring growth and raising taxes.
Japan will be expected to become a deficit country even if it enjoys a current account surplus at that point. Of the forces that pressure the government towards fiscal prudence, market pressure such as rising long-term interest rates should come into play.
Moderate pressure from the market notwithstanding, Japan will likely end up raising taxes and address the problems without inviting disturbance in the market. The Bank of Japan will then need to provide financial support to foster an environment favorable to realizing high growth.
The situation in the EU

In March 2005, the European Union’s Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), under the pressure of France and Germany, relaxed the rules to respond to criticisms of insufficient flexibility and to make the pact more enforceable. Permissiveness infested the theoretical regulatory framework at the boom phase of the business cycle.
At the urging of Germany and France, the ECOFIN agreed on a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The euro convergence criteria as spelled out in the SGP are:
1. Inflation rates – No more than 1.5 percentage points higher than the average of the three best performing (lowest inflation) member states of the EU.
2. Government finance
a) Annual government fiscal deficit – The ratio of the annual government fiscal deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) must not exceed 3% at the end of the preceding fiscal year. If not, it is at least required to reach a level close to 3%. Only exceptional and temporary excesses would be granted for exceptional cases.
b) Government debt – The ratio of gross government debt to GDP must not exceed 60% at the end of the preceding fiscal year. Even if the target cannot be achieved due to the specific conditions, the ratio must have sufficiently diminished and must be approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.
3. Exchange rate – Applicant countries should have joined the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM II) under the European Monetary System for two consecutive years and should not have devaluated its currency during the period.
4. Long-term interest rates - The nominal long-term interest rate must not be more than 2 percentage points higher than in the three lowest inflation member states.
The ceilings of 3% of GDP for budget deficit and 60% of GDP for public debt were maintained, but the decision to declare a country in excessive deficit can now rely on certain parameters: the behavior of the cyclically adjusted budget, the level of debt, the duration of the slow growth period and the possibility that the deficit is related to productivity-enhancing procedures.
The pact is part of a set of Council Regulations, decided upon the European Council Summit on March 22-23, 2005. Having adopted unneeded permissiveness at the boom cycle, Germany is now leading the charge to reduce fiscal deficits in eurozone by promoting austerity programs in every eurozone member state in the midst of a severe recession.
The curse of IMF conditionalities
The problem with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) “conditionalities” cure in a sovereign debt crisis is its insistence on a balanced fiscal budget at the wrong time – during a monetary-induced recession – thus adding to the economic pain unnecessarily and assigning disproportional burden on the most defenseless segment of the population (the working poor), and condemning the impaired economy to an unnecessarily long path toward recovery.
Some are concerned that long-term Federal debt may balloon up to 180% of GDP.
While this development should be arrested by fiscal prudence, that is perhaps only half of the solution. The other half is to direct the fiscal deficit toward GDP growth. Sometimes a large fiscal deficit can help actually reduce its share of the GDP if the fiscal deficit generates a bigger GDP.
The Federal fiscal deficit in 1919 was 16.8% of a GDP of $78.3 billion. The war time Federal deficit in 1945 was 24.1% of a GDP of $223 billion. Despite a high fiscal deficit, US GDP kept rising after war to $275.2 billion in 1948 with a fiscal surplus equaling 4.3% of GDP. The 2010 Federal deficit is projected to be 10.6% of a GDP of $14.6 trillion.
Between 1920 and 1929, the Federal budget had a small surplus, while GDP grew to $103.6 billion in 1929. After the 1929 crash, the 1930 GDP fell $12.4 billion, about 12%, to $91.2 billion, while the Federal budget under Hoover still had a surplus of 1% of GDP.
Not until after Franklin D Roosevelt came into office in 1933, when GDP had fallen by almost half to $56.4 billion, did the Federal deficit jump to 3.27% of GDP, in 1934. All through the New Deal years, the fiscal deficit stayed below 5% with the average annual deficit at around 3% of GDP. It did not rise until after the US entered World War II and peaked at 28.1% in 1943, 22.4% in 1944 and 24.1% in 1945. It fell to 9.1% in 1946 when GDP was $222.2 billion.
The total Federal fiscal deficit for the four years of World War II was about 100% of the average annual GDP of the same period. At the same time, the US grew to be the world’s strongest economy because the fiscal deficit was used to finance war production, not to bail out distressed financial institutions and inefficient industrial firms.
US fiscal deficit for fiscal year 2009 was more than $1.75 trillion, about 12.3% of GDP, the biggest since 1945. According the White House Budget Office, the cumulative fiscal deficit between FY2009 and FY2019 is projected to be almost $7 trillion. Total gross federal debt in 2008 was $10 trillion, projected to rise to over $23 trillion in 2019. Debt held by the public is projected to rise from $5.8 trillion in 2008 to $15.4 trillion in 2019. Interest expense in 2008 was $383 billion. The projection is expected to rise as both debt principal and interest rate are expected to rise.
The Issue of Inflation
Inflation is a different story. Moderate inflation is necessary for optimum economic growth, provided the burden of inflation is shared equally by all segments of the population, particularly not falling merely on wage earners. By the end of World War I, in 1919, US prices were rising at the rate of 15% annually, but the economy roared ahead as wages were rising in tandem with or slightly ahead of prices through wage-price control.
Income policies involving wage-price control have been employed throughout history from ancient Egypt, Babylon under Hammurabi, ancient Greece, during the American and French revolutions, the Civil War, World War I and II. A case can be made that that wage-price control has a mixed record as a way to restrain inflation, but it is irrefutable that income policies are effective in balancing supply and demand.
Yet in response to inflation, the Federal Reserve Board raised the discount rate in quick succession in 1919, from 4% to 7%, and kept it there for 18 months to try to rein in inflation by making money more expensive when banks borrowed from the Fed. The result was that in 1921, 506 banks failed.
The current financial crisis started in late-2007 and stabilized around mid-2009 after direct massive Fed intervention. It was by many measures an unprecedented phase in the history of the US banking system. In addition to the systemic stress and the stress faced by the largest investment and commercial banks, 168 depository institutions failed from 2007 through 2009. This was not the largest number of bank failures in one crisis. At the height of the savings and loan (S&L) crisis from 1987 to 1993, 1,858 banks and thrifts failed. However, the dollar value of failed banks assets in the financial crisis in 2007-2009 was $540 billion, roughly 1.5 times of the bank assets that failed in the S&L crisis in 1987-1993.
A research paper funded by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on “Bank Failures and the Cost of Systemic Risk: Evidence from 1900-1930″, by Paul Kupiec and Carlos Ramireza (July 2008) found that bank failures reduce subsequent economic growth. Over this period, a 0.12% (1 standard deviation) increase in the liabilities of the failed depository institutions results in a reduction of 17 percentage points in the growth rate of industrial production and a 4 percentage point decline in real gross national product (GNP) growth. The reductions occur within three quarters of the initial bank failure shock and can be interpreted as a measure of the costs of systemic risk in the banking sector. The FDIC had been created by the New Deal only after 1934 to protect depositors.
In the current crisis that began in mid-2007, with the discount rate falling steadily to 0.5% on December 16, 2008, from a high of 6.25% set on June 2006, still 25 banks failed in 2008 and were taken over by the FDICk, while 140 banks failed in 2009 and 33 banks failed in just the first two months of 2010, putting the fee-financed FDIC in financial stress. Yet the Fed raised the discount rate to 0.75% on February 19, 2010. In contrast, in the five years prior to 2008, only 11 banks had failed from the debt bubble even when the discount rate stayed within a range from 2% to 6.25%.
Volcker, the fearless slayer of the inflation dragon
In the 1980s, to counter stagflation in the US economy, the Fed under Paul Volcker (August 6, 1979 – August 11, 1987), kept the discount rate in the double-digit range from July 20, 1979 to August 27 1982, peaking at 14% on May 4, 1981. From August 1982 to its peak in August 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) grew from 776 to 2.722. The rise in market indices for the 19 largest markets in the world averaged 296% during this period.
Volcker, as chairman of the Fed before Greenspan, caused a double-dip recession in 1979-80 and 1981-82 to cure double-digit inflation, in the process bringing the unemployment rate into double digits for the first time since 1940. Volcker then piloted the economy through its slow long recovery that ended with the 1987 crash. To his credit, Volcker did manage to bring unemployment below 5.5%, half a point lower than during the 1978-79 boom, and the acknowledged structural unemployment rate of 6%.
Two months after Volcker left the Fed, to be succeeded by Greenspan, the high interest rate left by Volcker, inter alia, led to Black Monday, October 19, 1987, when stock markets around the world crashed mercilessly, beginning in Hong Kong, spreading west to Tokyo and Europe as markets opened across global time zones, hitting New York only after markets in other time zones had already declined by a significant margin.
The DJIA dropped 22.61%, or 508 points, to 1.738.74 on Black Monday. On October 11, 2007, the DJIA hit a high of 14.198.10. On March 2, 2009, it lost almost 300 points, or 4.2%, to end at 6763.29, its lowest point since April 25, 1997.
By the end of October 1987, stock markets in Hong Kong had fallen 45.8%, Australia 41.8%, New Zealand 60%, Spain 31%, the United Kingdom 26.4%, the United States 22.68%, and Canada 22.5%. Basic assumptions such as market fundamentalism, efficient market hypothesis and market equilibrium were challenged by events. Despite that dismal record in the 1980s, Volcker was appointed by President Barack Obama two decades later as first chair of the President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board on February 6, 2009.
The 1987 stock-market crash was unleashed by the sudden collapse of the safety dam of portfolio insurance, a hedging strategy made possible by the new option pricing theory advanced by Nobel laureates Robert C Merton and Myron S Scholes. Institutional investors found it possible to manage risk better by protecting their portfolios from unexpected losses with positions in stock-index futures. Any fall in stock prices could be compensated by selling futures bought when stock prices were higher.
This strategy, while operative for each individual portfolio, actually caused the entire market to collapse from the dynamics of automatic herd-selling of futures. Investors could afford to take greater risks in rising markets because portfolio insurance offered a disciplined way of avoiding risk in declines, albeit only individually. But the reduction in individual risk was achieved by an increase in systemic risk.
As some portfolio insurers sold and market prices fell precipitously, the computer programs of other insurers then triggered further sales, causing further declines that in turn caused the first group of insurers to sell even more shares and so on, in a high-speed downward spiral. This in turn electronically generated other computer driven sell orders from the same sources, and the market experienced a computer-generated meltdown at high speed.
The unlearned lesson of the 1987 crash
The 1987 crash provided clear empirical evidence of the structural flaw in market fundamentalism, which is the belief that the optimum common welfare is only achievable through a market equilibrium created by the effect of countless individual decisions of all market participants each seeking to maximize his own private gain through the efficient market hypothesis, and that such market equilibrium should not be distorted by any collective measures in the name of the common good or systemic stability.
Aggregate individual decisions and actions in unorganized unison can and often do turn into systemic crises that are detrimental to the common good. Unregulated free markets can quickly become failed markets. Markets do not simply grow naturally after a spring rain. Markets are artificial constructs designed collectively by key participants who agree to play by certain rules. All markets are planned with the aim of eliminating any characteristic of being free for all operations. The “free market” is as much a fantasy as free love.
In response to the 1987 crash, the US Federal Reserve under its newly installed chairman, Alan Greenspan, with merely nine weeks in the powerful office, immediately flooded the banking system with new reserves by having the Fed Open Market Committee (FOMC) buy massive quantities of government securities from the repo market. He announced the day after the crash that the Fed would “serve as a source of liquidity to support the economic and financial system.” Greenspan created $12 billion of new bank reserves by buying up government securities, the proceeds of which would enter the banking system.
The $12 billion injection of “high-power money” in one day caused the Fed funds rate to fall by 75 basis points and halted the financial panic, though it did not cure the financial problem, which caused the US economy to plunge into a recession that persisted for five subsequent years. Worst of all, the monetarist cure for systemic collapse put the financial world in a pattern of crisis every decade: the 1987 crash, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the financial crisis of 2007.
High-power money injected into the banking system enables banks to create more bank money through multiple credit-recycling, lending repeatedly the same funds minus the amount of required bank reserves at each turn. At a 10% reserve requirement, $12 billion of new high-power money could generate in theory up to $120 billion of new bank money in the form of recycled bank loans from new deposits by borrowers.
The Brady Commission investigation of the 1987 crash showed that on October 19, 1987, portfolio insurance trades in S&P 500 Index futures and New York Exchange stocks that crashed the market amounted to only $6 billion by a few large traders, out of a market trading total of $42 billion. The Fed’s injection of $120 billion was three times the market trading total and 20 times the trades executed by portfolio insurance.
Yet post-mortem analyses of the 1987 crash suggest that though portfolio insurance strategies were designed to be interest-rate-neutral, the declining Fed funds rate was actually causing financial firms that used these strategies globally to lose money from exchange-rate effects. The belated awareness of this effect caused many institutions that had not understood the full dynamics of the strategies to shut down their previously highly profitable bond arbitrage units.
The rise of hedge funds
This move later led to the migratory birth of new, stand-alone hedge funds such as Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), which continued to apply similar highly leveraged strategies for spectacular trading profit of more than 70% returns on equity that eventual led it to the edge of insolvency when Russia unexpectedly defaulted on its dollar bonds in the summer of 1998. The Fed had to orchestrate a private-sector creditor bailout of
LTCM to limit systemic damage to the financial markets. The net effect was to extend the liquidity bubble further – causing it to migrate from a distressed sector to a healthy sector.
The 1987 crash reflected a stock-market bubble burst the liquidity cure for which led to a property bubble, which, when it also burst, in turn caused the savings-and-loan (S&L) crisis.
While the 1987 crash was technically induced by program trading, the falling dollar was also a major factor. Although the dollar had started to decline in exchange value by late February 1985 due to the US fiscal deficit, that decline had yet to reduce the US trade deficit, causing protectionist sentiment in the US to mount as the trade deficit swelled to an annual rate of $120 billion in the summer of 1985.
The issue of exchange rates
In part to deflect protectionist legislation, US officials arranged a meeting of the Group of 5 (G-5 – France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) at the Plaza Hotel in New York on September 22, 1985, with the purpose of ratifying an initiative to bring about an orderly decline in the dollar, observing that “recent shifts in fundamental economic conditions among their countries, together with policy commitments for the future, have not been fully reflected in exchange markets”, and concluded that “further orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar currencies against the dollar is desirable”, and that the G5 members “stand ready to cooperate more closely to encourage this”.
During the seven weeks following the Plaza Accord, G-5 authorities sold nearly $9 billion, of which the US sold $3.3 billion for other currencies, while speculators profited by shorting the dollar.
The dollar had declined to seven-year lows in early 1987 amid signs of weakness in the US economy while the US trade deficit continued to grow. Demand was sustained not by income but by debt. Public statements by the Ronald Reagan administration officials were interpreted in exchange markets as indicating a lack of official concern about the ramifications of further declines in the dollar.
On February 22, 1987, officials of the G-5 plus Canada and Italy met at the Louvre in Paris to announce that the dollar had fallen enough. But despite heavy intervention purchases of dollars following the Louvre Accord, the dollar continued to decline, particularly against the yen. Market participants perceived delays in the implementation of expansionary fiscal measures in Japan expected after the Louvre Accord and talks of trade sanctions on some Japanese products heightened concern about tension in US-Japanese trade relations.
Following the Louvre Accord, the G-7 authorities intervened heavily in support of the dollar throughout the episodes of dollar weakness in 1987, and sold dollars on several occasions when the dollar strengthened significantly. Net official dollar purchases by the G-7 and other major central banks effectively financed more than two-thirds of the $144 billion US current account deficit in 1987. The US share of these purchases was $8.5 billion, and the share of the other G-7 countries was $82 billion, since the non-dollar export-dependent governments wanted desperately to halt the appreciation of their currencies.
Record US trade deficits and market perceptions that the G-7 authorities were pursuing monetary measures best suited to their own separate domestic economic objectives soon sparked a further sell-off of the dollar. This contributed to a worldwide collapse of equity prices, which had risen to levels unsupported by fundamentals. The dollar’s decline gathered new momentum when the Federal Reserve under its new chairman, Greenspan, moved more aggressively than its foreign counterparts to supply liquidity in the aftermath of the 1987 stock market crash which had been triggered by program trading on portfolio insurance derivatives arbitraging on macroeconomic instability in exchange rates and interest rates.
Domestic accommodative monetary stance
The Federal Reserve’s actions under Greenspan in 1987 led market participants to conclude that the Fed would emphasize domestic market objectives with accommodative monetary stance, if necessary at the cost of a further decline in the dollar. By year-end, the dollar’s value had fallen 21% against the yen and 14% against the mark from its levels at the time of the Louvre Accord, while Greenspan, the wizard of bubble-land, was on his way to being hailed as the greatest central banker in history.
Two decades later, by 2007, the Greenspan put was called by the market and trillions of dollars were lost.
The issue of unemployment

Half a century before 1987, beginning in 1921, deflation had descended on the US economy like a perfect storm from Fed tight monetary policy under chairman Daniel R Grissinger, with farm commodity prices falling 50% from their 1920 peak, throwing farmers into mass bankruptcies. Business activity fell by one-third; manufacturing output fell by 42%; unemployment rose fivefold to 11.9%, adding 4 million to the jobless count.
Since mid-2007, the US has lost more than 6 million jobs, with 4.4 million jobs lost in the first year of the Obama administration. Latest government estimate puts the Great Recession of 2008 as having lost 8.4 million jobs thus far and no more than 1.4 million jobs are expected to be restored by the end of 2010. Unemployment is expected to stay near double digit for the foreseeable future. If workers who have given up looking for work are also counted, the unemployment rate is close to 14% in 2010.
Some are attempting to put a positive spin on US jobs numbers for February 2010, when the unemployment rate, though still at 9.7%, held steady. The economy shed 36,000 jobs in January, but the good news was that the pace of job loss was moderating. An average of 27,000 jobs was lost each month since November 2009, compared with 727,000 jobs a month on average over the same period in 2008. When the laws of gravity says what goes up must eventually come down, there is no law that say what goes down will eventually come back up. That is how swimmers drown; they float back up only after life has long left the body. Only dead bodies float naturally.
While the unemployment rate is rising more slowly, it seems likely to remain high. And despite the recent policy insistence that the top three priorities are jobs, jobs and jobs, both congress and the Obama administration are not taking concrete steps to create them quickly beyond the usual lukewarm tax incentives.
By February 2010, 8.4 million jobs had been lost since the financial crisis began in July 2007. The normal 2.7 million jobs needed to absorb new workers coming into the economy were never created, leaving the economy bereft of 11.1 million jobs. To fill that cumulative employment gap while keeping a growing work force fully employed would require more than 400,000 new jobs a month for the next three years, considerably in excess of even the most optimistic projections under current job creation policies and programs. Further, healthcare reform, if it is expected to save cost, will inevitably include a reduction of jobs.
Five states reported new highs for joblessness in January 2010: California, at 12.5%; South Carolina, 12.6%; Florida, 11.9%; North Carolina, 11.1%; and Georgia, 10.4%. Michigan’s unemployment rate is still the nation’s highest, at 14.3%, followed by Nevada with 13% and Rhode Island at 12.7%. South Carolina and California rounded out the top five.
Employers are unlikely to make new hires until they can profitably restore their current part-time work force to full time. In the private sector, just restoring hours cut during the recession will neutralize the equivalent of 2.8 million new jobs.
As of June 2010, the US, with a working population of 131,456,000 out of a total population of 307,000,000, had 14,600,000 workers unemployed, yielding an unemployment rate of 9.5%. But unemployment is not equally shared among all worker types. Among teenagers it was 25.7%, among blacks was 15.4%, among Hispanics 12.4%, among whites 8.6% and among Asians 7.7%.
In July, the US jobless rate held steady at 9.5%, while the government’s broader measure of unemployment was also unchanged at 16.5%. The comprehensive gauge of labor under utilization, known as the “U-6″ for its data classification by the Labor Department, measures people who have stopped looking for work or who cannot find full-time jobs. Both rates held steady despite a drop in the number of people who are employed. The number of unemployed people in the work force dropped, but that was more than offset by a decline in the overall size of the work force still looking for work. Though more people were no longer in the labor force, fewer of those dropouts said they were currently looking for work. This helped keep the broader rate steady.
The labor force data were affected by a temporary end to extended unemployment benefits. The Labor Department survey was conducted before the senate expanded an extended-jobless-benefits program through the end of 2010. Beginning in August 2010, many of those people who dropped out of the labor force in the previous two months may return to active job seeking. If the number of jobs created remains as muted as it has been the previous few months, it could send both unemployment rates higher.
The battle over the extension of unemployment benefits in the senate set the stage for more bruising fights in the not-too-distant future. Lawmakers on July 21 voted to continue eligibility for extended unemployment benefits through late in the year. But if history is any guide, there will likely be at least one more call for an extension.
Meanwhile, the legislation allows job seekers to receive unemployment benefits for up to 99 weeks, depending on their state of residence. In the coming months, the number of recipients who remain unemployed beyond 99 weeks could increase substantially.
According to an analysis by Goldman Sachs economist Alec Phillips, unemployment benefits are extended an average of 23 months following the peak in unemployment rate. In the current downturn, the peak in the jobless rate – 10.1% – came in October 2009. To reach the average, unemployment benefits would need to be extended through September 2011, which would require another act of congress.
Congress is taking its time debating an undersized jobs bill that is not expected to create anywhere near the jobs that the economy needs in 2010.
The next unemployment trouble will come from the public sector. Without timely and adequate federal aid, the states and local governments will be forced by falling tax revenue to tighten fiscal budgets, which will mean layoffs and cancelled private contracts, both of which would squeeze demand in the private sector to further reduce local government revenue in a downward spiral.
Thus a sound fiscal policy does not automatically mean a balanced fiscal budget even in the long run. The current mantra on fiscal austerity adds up to a poor fiscal policy.
Source: Asia Times